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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. 
HEATHER JO RODRIGUEZ, : Case No. 20040566-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : Respondent is not incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 20, 2005, Heather Jo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) filed her Brief of 
Respondent on Certiorari Review addressing the only issue on which the State requested 
certiorari review: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created 
an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from 
respondent." Order dated Oct. 18, 2004; see Rspt. Br. at 14-29; see Addendum A. Oral 
argument for this issue was held on December 5, 2005. On September 6, 2006, this Court 
issued an order asking the parties to "supplement their briefing to address" the following 
issue: "[W]hether the court of appeals properly held that the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Ms. Rodriguez did not 
justify the warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." Order dated Sept. 6, 2006; see Addendum B. 
This Court should not consider the supplemental issue outlined in its September 6, 
2006, order because the State did not ask this Court to consider the issue in its petition for 
a writ of certiorari. See infra at Part I. Regardless, this Court should affirm the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert. 
granted, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004), because the court of appeals properly held the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from 
Rodriguez did not justify the warrantless search under the exigent circumstances 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.1 See infra at Part II. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
TEST IN RODRIGUEZ'S CASE BECAUSE THIS ISSUE WAS NOT 
FAIRLY INCLUDED IN THE STATE'S PETITION FOR A WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
"Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals' decision and is 
further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petition[]." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. 
Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a) (2002) (granting this Court jurisdiction over decisions of court of appeals); DeBry 
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) (stating issues not raised in petition for 
certiorari are not properly before the court); Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 637 
This Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the following issue: 
"[W]hether the court of appeals properly held that the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Ms. Rodriguez did not 
justify the warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." Order dated Sept. 6, 2006. Defense counsel understands this issue to 
encompass only the court of appeals' application of the totality of the circumstances test 
to the facts of Rodriguez's case to determine exigent circumstances did not justify the 
warrantless blood draw. If this Court understands the issue more broadly, then defense 
counsel requests the opportunity for additional briefing. 
2 
(Utah 1995). The "statement of a question presented [for certiorari review] will be 
deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein," and "[o]nly the 
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the 
Supreme Court.55 Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). 
In its petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, the State asked this Court to 
review one issue: "Did the court of appeals err55 by rejecting the State's argument that 
"the evanescence of blood alcohol evidence alone creates an exigency that, coupled with 
probable cause, justifies a warrantless blood draw?55 Cert. Pt. at 1. The State's focus on 
this issue in its statement of the question presented for review and throughout its petition 
made clear it had one purpose in seeking a writ of certiorari—to convince this Court to 
ignore its long tradition of applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine 
exigency and instead adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases. IcL 1, 5-11. This one 
purpose is clearly and narrowly described in the State's petition and cannot be said to 
fairly include the entirely separate issue of whether, if this Court declines to adopt a per 
se rule of exigency, the court of appeals properly held the totality of the circumstances in 
this case did not justify the warrantless extraction of Rodriguez's blood. Id; Utah R. 
App. P. 49(a)(4) (limiting review on certiorari to "subsidiary question[s] fairly included" 
in "question presented" for review). 
Thus, this Court should limit its consideration of this case to the only issue 
properly presented for certiorari review: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, 
without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a 
3 
blood sample from respondent." Order dated Oct. 18, 2004. Moreover, this Court should 
affirm because the court of appeals correctly declined to create a per se rule of exigency 
that would justify blood draws in all DUI cases, regardless of the time and means 
available to officers to seek a warrant. See Rspt. Br. at 14-29. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
DECISION BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY 
HELD THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW DID NOT 
JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH UNDER THE EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
"'[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless 
"the exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that 
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'5' 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006) (Stuart ID (citation omitted). 
Exigent circumstances are "'those "that would cause a reasonable person to believe that 
[immediate] entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other 
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other 
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.'"" Brigham City 
v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13,1[18, 122 P.3d 506 (Stuart I) (citations omitted), rev'd by Stuart II, 
126 S.Ct 1943.2 
In Stuart II, the Supreme Court reversed the result this Court reached by applying the 
totality of the circumstances test to the facts of Stuart's case. Stuart II, 126 S.Ct. at 1949. 
The Supreme Court, however, did not address this Court's decision to apply the totality 
of the circumstances test rather than adopting a per se rule of exigency in domestic 
4 
"[EJxigency does not evolve from one individual fact." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); see Rodriguez, 2004 UTApp 198 at 1(15. "Instead, there is 
often a mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient." Id. Thus, the 
determination of whether exigency exists "is based on the totality of the circumstances." 
City of Oremv. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see, e.g., Stuart II 
126 S.Ct. at 1947 (applying totality of circumstances test to determine whether 
warrantless home entry was justified by exigency). The totality of the circumstances test 
is a "flexible, common sense" test. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,Tf27, 104 P.3d 1265. A 
reviewing court's '"task is to review the totality of facts and circumstances of the 
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was proper.'" Henrie, 868 P.2d at 
1388 (quoting Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258); see Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at Tfl5. 
In determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search, 
appellate courts look closely at "the time available for the officers to have obtained a 
search warrant once [events] triggered the existence of probable cause and immediate 
exigency." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 
(1966) (holding, in case where federal law did not yet permit telephonic warrants, 
exigency existed to justify warrantless blood draw because "there was no time to seek out 
violence cases, or the reasons it gave for making this decision. Id. at 1947-49. Thus, this 
Court's strong renunciation of per se rules to determine exigency remains good law. Id.; 
Stuart I, 2005 UT 13 at ffi[40, 43-44. In fact, in Stuart II, the Supreme Court, like this 
Court, applied the totality of the circumstances test, despite the presence of domestic 
violence, to determine whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless home 
entry. Stuart II, 126 S.Ct. at 1949. 
5 
a magistrate and secure a warrant"); United States v. Talkingtom 843 F.2d 1041, 1046 
(7th Cir. 1988) (remanding because record did not tell "length of time that elapsed from 
Agent[5s] [] first observation of the fire until the agents stormed [defendant's] home/' so 
appellate court could not determine "whether it was possible to obtain a telephonic 
warrant under the circumstances"); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990) 
("The amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by traditional means has always been 
considered in determining whether circumstances are exigent."). 
For example, in United States v. Patino, 830 F.2d 1413 (7th Cir. 1987), an agent 
"observed [perpetrator] outside [defendant's] apartment-house" and "called for backup 
assistance to make the arrest because he thought that [perpetrator] might be armed." Id. 
at 1416. The backup agents "were at the time thirty minutes away." Id "The agent at 
the scene waited for reinforcements before making any attempt to enter [defendant's] 
home in search of [perpetrator]." Id. "Inexplicably, during that thirty-minute period he 
did not attempt to arrange for a telephonic search warrant." IcL On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit held that this "[o]ne fact alone demonstrate^] the lack of exigent circumstances 
and the consequent unreasonableness of the entry of [defendant's] residence without a 
search warrant." Id 
Similarly, in United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1987), where "the 
defendant drug dealer [] indicated he would wait in his hotel room for about thirty 
minutes for the undercover agent to return with the cash and there was no indication he 
6 
suspected that he was being set up," the Seventh Circuit found there was "no emergency 
justifying a warrantless search" and "noted that under these facts, seeking a telephonic 
search warrant would have been an appropriate course of action." Patino, 803 F.2d at 
1416 (citing Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456, 457, 458-59). 
Conversely, in Ashe, this Court held that officers investigating a drug sale 
transaction did not have "the time required to obtain a telephone warrant" because "there 
was no delay on behalf of the officers," and "no delay beyond those few minutes required 
by the officers to arrest the conspirators and drive to [the defendant's] house could be 
considered safe." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68. Similarly, in Henrie, the defendant fled the 
scene of a car accident, drove home, and retreated to her apartment. Henrie, 868 P.2d at 
1385-86. Although "the police could have sought a telephonic warrant," the court of 
appeals found the failure to get a telephonic warrant did not preclude the existence of 
exigent circumstances because "the officers were engaged in a continuous and ongoing 
search for defendant, who had left the scene of an accident moments earlier." Id. at 1393 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals properly held 
the totality of the circumstances did not justify the warrantless blood draw under the 
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
Below, the trial court held exigency existed based entirely on one circumstance—"the 
dissipation of alcohol in the blood." R. 309; see Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at [^17. 
Following this Court's and the Supreme Court's long tradition of applying the totality of 
7 
the circumstances test, rather than a per se rule, to determine whether exigency justified a 
warrantless search, the court of appeals concluded the trial court's holding was error. 
RodrigvraL,2004UT App 19& ^<H\4-\5; res,IfateAStates v. Banks, S4QU.S. 1 1 , % 
(2003) (noting Fourth Amendment analysis has "largely avoid[ed] categories and 
protocols for searches" because it is "too hard to invent categories without giving short 
shrift to details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating 
marginal ones" (citation omitted)); Pennsvlvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) 
(noting "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis "is always 'the reasonableness in all 
the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal 
security'" (citation omitted)); Stuart I, 2005 UT 13 at 1fl[40-4l, 4 3 " 4 4 (declining to adopt 
per se rule of exigency for domestic violence cases, despite "unquestioned evils of 
domestic violence," because "categorical extension would unduly threaten the special 
protection the Fourth Amendment bestows on people"). 
Rather than creating a per se rule that "the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is 
sufficient to create an exigent circumstance," R. 309, the trial court should have analyzed 
the totality of the circumstances unique to Rodriguez's case. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT 
App 198 at T|U 14-15. Only an analysis of all the facts and circumstances would have 
allowed the trial court to accurately determine whether "a reasonable person" would have 
"believe[d] that [immediate] entry . . . was necessary to prevent . . . the destruction of 
relevant evidence." Stuart I, 2005 UT 13 at [^18 (quotations and citation omitted) (second 
alteration in original); see Stuart II, 126 S.Ct. at 1949 (applying totality of circumstances 
8 
test to determine whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless home entry); Welsh 
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (holding, where "only potential emergency" was 
officers' need to preserve suspect's blood-alcohol level, insufficient exigency to justify 
home entry because gravity of underlying offense for which arrest was made was "an 
additional important factor to be considered"); Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[14-15. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in the record and the 
trial court's findings of fact, the court of appeals then correctly determined exigency did 
not justify the warrantless blood draw. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ffi[15, 17-20 
(citing Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,^(19-20, 52 P.3d 1158) (other citations omitted). 
The record shows two officers had the time and means to seek a warrant: Officer Larsen, 
who supervised the investigation of the scene and ordered the blood draw, and Officer 
Swensen, who was dispatched to witness the blood draw. See Rspt. Br. at 6-9 (referring 
to Officer Larsen as "supervising officer"). 
First, Officer Larsen was dispatched to the scene approximately five minutes after 
the accident occurred. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at P ; R. 560:17. When he arrived, 
medical personnel had already treated Rodriguez and Stewart and transported them to the 
hospital, and officers at the scene h^cTalready gathered the State's evidence. Rodriguez, 
2004 UT App 198 at ffi[2-3; R. 560:3-7, 12-17. With the bulk of the investigation 
complete, Larsen had only to decide whether he believed a blood draw was necessary and 
to dispatch an officer to witness the blood draw, which he did within twenty-five minutes 
9 
of the accident.3 Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at1f3; R. 560:14-16, 19. 
After dispatching Officer Swensen to witness the blood draw, the record shows 
Larsen had ample time and means to seek a warrant. The accident occurred a short 
distance from the courthouse and at a time when the courthouse was open and warrants 
could be readily requested. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[19; R. 286; 560:3, 8; 
compare State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding failure to 
obtain telephonic warrant did not destroy exigency because "nearest pay phone was 
located two hours away and radio contact was not viable"). More important, unlike the 
officers in Schmerber, Larsen did not have to find time to travel to the courthouse 
because he could have applied for a telephonic warrant from the scene of the accident. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (1999) (statute authorizing officers to obtain warrant 
by telephone); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71; United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 51-
52 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining the amendment to rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure that authorized telephonic search warrants did not become effective 
3
 Presumably, Larsen believed he had probable cause to draw Rodriguez's blood at the 
point he dispatched Officer Swensen to witness the blood draw. It is questionable 
whether Larsen made an actual probable cause determination based on the evidence 
relayed to him at the scene, or whether he simply decided to draw Rodriguez's blood 
because, as explained by Swensen, blood draws are "just as we do in accidents." R. 
560:24, 54. Although Rodriguez disputes the existence of probable cause to justify the 
blood draw, Larsen acted as if he believed there was probable cause when he dispatched 
Swensen to witness the blood draw. Since the record demonstrates little, if any, 
additional evidence supporting probable cause, it is from that point that this Court should 
determine whether exigency existed. See Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266 (holding appellate 
courts, when determining whether exigency justified a warrantless search, look closely at 
"time available for the officers to have obtained a search warrant once" events "triggered 
the existence of probable cause and immediate exigency"). 
10 
until August 1, 1977); State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("[RJecognizing the delay that is often incurred in procuring a warrant, Utah has allowed 
for issuance of a search warrant based on a sworn telephonic statement of the officer 
seeking the warrant." (citation omitted)). 
Further, unlike the circumstances in Schmerber, Ashe, and Henrie, at the time 
Larsen decided a blood draw was necessary, he was not engaged in an ongoing and 
continuous investigation that prevented him from seeking a warrant. See Schmerber, 384 
U.S. at 770-71; Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68; Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1393. Rather, the record 
shows the investigation was largely complete, any evidence that remained to be gathered 
was being gathered by other officers, and the injured had already been cared for and 
transported to hospitals. R. 560:3-8, 12-17. In fact, Larsen was not even hampered by 
the need to write a police report. R. 560:14. Finally, similar to Patino, and Diaz, there 
was no emergency inherent to the investigation itself that prevented Larsen from seeking 
a warrant because he knew it would take time for the dispatched officer and the blood 
draw technician to travel to the hospital, locate the driver of the vehicle, and prepare for 
the blood draw. R. 560:12-17; compare Patino, 830 F.2d at 1416; Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456, 
457, 458-59 with Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68. 
Second, Officer Swensen was dispatched to witness the blood draw approximately 
twenty-five minutes after the accident. R. 560:19, 50. He initially went to the wrong 
hospital. R. 560:19-21, 50. When he arrived at the correct hospital, he questioned 
Rodriguez briefly about her name. R. 560:23, 52. He then "just st[ood] there waiting" 
11 
for twenty to twenty-five minutes for the blood technician to arrive. R. 560:53. 
Like Larsen, Swensen had the time and means to seek a warrant,4 Swensen was 
only a short distance from the courthouse, he had access to a telephone throughout the 
investigation, and the accident occurred at a time when the courthouse was open and 
warrants could be readily requested in person or by telephone. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT 
App 198 at 1119; R. 286; 560:3, 8; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (1999) (statute 
permitting officers to obtain warrant by telephone); compare Morck, 821 P.2d at 1194 
(holding failure to obtain telephonic warrant did not destroy exigency because nearest 
pay phone was "two hours away and radio contact was not viable"). 
Specifically, the record shows Swensen could have called for a warrant from the 
moment he was dispatched to witness the blood draw. He could have called while he was 
driving to the hospital, especially considering the additional time he took driving to the 
wrong hospital. R. 560:19-21, 50-51. He also could have called after he arrived at the 
hospital—during the time he was "just standing there waiting" for twenty to twenty-five 
As explained in footnote 3, probable cause, if it arose at all, likely arose at the time 
Larsen dispatched Swensen to witness the blood draw. See supra at note 3. Swensen 
testified that when he witnessed the blood draw he did not suspect a crime had been 
committed and knew only that he "was to witness a blood draw because of the traffic 
accident." R. 560:56. Accordingly, Swensen did not conduct any investigation at the 
hospital that could have meaningfully assisted in establishing probable cause. The record 
shows his entire investigation of Rodriguez involved determining she was being 
"uncooperative" and "belligerent" with the hospital staff, and asking her for her name, 
which was ultimately unhelpful since Swensen did not know the name of the person he 
was looking for. R. 560:22-23, 51-53. Regardless, if probable cause somehow arose at 
the time Swensen found and questioned Rodriguez, then both Swensen and Larsen still 
had time to obtain a warrant while they waited twenty-five minutes for the blood 
technician to arrive. R. 560:53. 
12 
minutes for the blood technician to arrive. R. 560:53; see Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1268 
(suggesting warrant not required because officers could not have "waited even an 
additional twenty or thirty minutes to obtain a telephone search warrant"); Patino, 830 
F.2d at 1416 (holding fact that officer waited for backup agents who were thirty minutes 
away but did not seek warrant "alone demonstrate^] the lack of exigent circumstances"); 
Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456-59 (holding no exigency where defendant drug dealer indicated he 
would wait thirty minutes for undercover agent to return). 
Further, no emergency inherent to the investigation itself prevented Swensen from 
seeking a warrant. He was not interrogating Rodriguez during the twenty-five minute 
break in the investigation and he was not guarding Rodriguez because Rodriguez was 
"receiving medical treatment" and the hospital personnel, not Swensen, prevented 
Rodriguez from leaving the hospital. R. 560:53, 57; compare Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68 
(holding officers investigating drug transaction did not have "time required to obtain a 
telephone warrant" because "there was no delay on behalf of the officers," and "no delay 
beyond those few minutes required by the officers to arrest the conspirators and drive to 
[defendant's] house could be considered safe"). 
In other words, the record shows two officers had the time and means to seek a 
warrant but neither chose to do so. R. 560:15, 24, 53-54. There is nothing in the record 
to suggest the circumstances of the situation prevented the officers from seeking a 
warrant. Id. Rather, the officers' testimony suggests they simply overlooked the warrant 
requirement in favor of the Salt Lake City Police Department policy that blood draws are 
13 
"a matter of routine" and do not require warrants. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at l(fl[19-
20; see State v. Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127, 132 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) ("The officers' rote 
application of the department's untenable policy that exigent circumstances always exist 
in vehicular manslaughter and aggravated assault cases violated [defendant's] right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure."). Specifically, when asked whether he made 
any attempt to obtain a warrant, Larsen responded, "No," he just "sent an officer over and 
had the blood draw done." R. 560:14-16. Similarly, Swensen testified he did not suspect 
a crime had been committed, but knew only that he "was to witness a blood draw because 
of the traffic accident." R. 560:56. He then told Rodriguez that the blood technician was 
"going to draw blood from her just as we do in accidents." R. 560:24, 54. 
In sum, the record shows both officers had the time and means to obtain a warrant, 
but neither officer even attempted to begin the warrant process. Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 
131 (holding no exigency in blood draw case where police did not even try to obtain a 
warrant because "mere possibility of delay does not give rise to an exigency"). Such 
actions undermine the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which is '"basic to 
a free society,5" Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (citation omitted), and not to be "lightly 
disregarded." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97,Tf22, 57 P.3d 1052 (noting "'warrant 
requirement is an important check upon the power of the State to subject individuals to 
unreasonable searches and seizures'" (citation omitted)). Thus, this Court should affirm 
because the court of appeals correctly held the record did not demonstrate exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
Rodriguez requests this Court to affirm the court of appeals' decision in State v. 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198. 
SUBMITTED this [O day of October, 2006. 
fZZ&/4rr<> LCWTSEPPt 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20040566-SC 
Heather Jo Rodriguez, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on July 7, 2004. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue: 
Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without 
more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless 
extraction of a blood sample from respondent. 
Date 
Ws /% 20fr 
FOR THE COURT: 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
^r\—-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on October 19, 2004, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
LORI SEPPI 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the courts listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN /KATHY SHUPE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
PAULETTE STAGG 
COURT OF APPEALS 
45 0 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20040566-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 011907005 
ADDENDUM B 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT? 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH ^_ ^ , 
SEP 0 6 2006 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, No. 20040566 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Heather Jo Rodriguez, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ORDER 
The Court has concluded that it improvidently omitted from 
its order granting certiorari review the question of whether the 
court of appeals properly held that the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the warrantless extraction of a blood 
sample from Ms. Rodriguez did not justify the warrantless search 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Accordingly, the Court invites the parties to supplement 
their briefing to address this issue. Initial supplemental 
briefs of appellant and appellee shall be filed no later than 
October 6, 2006. Reply briefs shall be filed no later than 
October 23, 2006. The Court does not expect additional oral 
argument. 
/ )^l 
Dated this (P day of September, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September 6, 2006, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
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LORI SEPPI 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MATTHEW D BATES 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 3 00 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
JANICE L FROST 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE-CITY ATTORNEY 
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S SALT LAKE UT 84115 
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Dated this September 6, 2006. 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20040566 
District Court No. 011907005 
